REBECCA ABRAHAMS, BRAD BLOG - In September, 2003 Linda Lamone, the Administrator of Maryland's State Board of Elections and President of the National Association of State Election Directors hands over a critical study on the security of the Diebold Election Systems machines that count all of Maryland's votes. . . The original SAIC report, coming in at nearly 200 pages, was reduced, redacted and altered such that the only version the public — or even state officials including the Governor and the full State Board of Elections — would ever be allowed to see was a wholly sanitized 38-page version of the report.
Until now.
For the first time, we've been able to review the complete, much sought-after, unredacted version of the SAIC report which has been kept at bay from Maryland state officials. . . as well as the computer science and security community. . . as well as the election integrity community and public at large since it was originally completed in 2003.
It has been called "The Pentagon Papers of Electronic Voting Systems" by some members of the computer science and security community. . .
Enter the world of electronic voting machines, the 2002 "cure" to 2000's hanging and dimpled chads. . . Diebold and the other manufacturers insist that their machines are safe and secure yet every single cyber security expert and computer scientist has, for years, been screaming into an empty wilderness of media attention, that. . .
- The machines can be hacked, by the implanting of malicious code, at the factory
- The machines can be hacked during transport from the factory
- The machines can be hacked while on "sleepovers" before the election
- The machines can be hacked (in 1 minute with a .50 cent mini bar key) during the election
- These machines can be hacked, at the tabulator, after the election.
What makes this SAIC report, "The Pentagon Papers of Electronic Voting" as some computer experts have described it, so important is that:
It shows, in black and white, that what Diebold says to election officials and voters across the country is not the truth. It shows that there are virtually no security protocols in place for certain Diebold machines and that the recommended security protocols were purposely removed from the publicly released version of the report. It shows that the analyzed Diebold machines were not functional nor secure for use in elections and raises serious doubts that they are ready for the November 7, 2006 midterm elections. . .
Diebold, in return for allowing their super secret, proprietary machines to be examined by the independent laboratory, insisted on two huge concessions from the state of Maryland.
First, SAIC would not be allowed to even look at the source code, the heart and guts of electronic voting machines.
Second, they would be allowed to go through the SAIC Report, line by line, and redact anything and everything that they felt was proprietary, had a potential for security breaches or could provide a roadmap for anyone who wanted to compromise the system.
In other words, whatever they wanted to do with the publicly released version of the report they were allowed to do so.
468 federal seats and countless state and local contests are being decided by Diebold and other similar electronic voting machines. The outcome of these elections will set the direction of our country for at least the next two years.
The issue is whether or not Diebold has implemented the critical changes in its software and hardware called for by the full, genuine un-redacted SAIC Report
Much more, complete with links at http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3719&print=1
No comments:
Post a Comment