GARY IMHOFF, DC WATCH - The District of Columbia government and WMATA [the subway system] fear that they are falling behind New York City in the race to appease terrorists by destroying American freedoms ourselves before the terrorists have a chance to. WMATA, with the encouragement of the city administration, is seriously considering instituting random searches of Metro riders. This is certain to be politically popular because the resultant humiliation and inconvenience of subjecting citizens to searches by armed police authorities -- without any reason to suspect those citizens of any crime -- will fool a lot of people into thinking that they are safer. The less liberty, the less privacy, the less freedom we have, the greater our safety and security will be, right? Certainly, the Chinese must think so.
But if random searches of subway riders are a good thing, why should those searches be limited to subway riders? Wouldn't random searches of cars on the streets and pedestrians on the sidewalks be even better? And if that would be better, why shouldn't the police conduct random searches of our homes and workplaces, without the bothersome necessity of having to actually suspect us of any wrongdoing? If we're better protected by having the police inspect whatever we carry with us, why wouldn't we be even better protected by having the police inspect whatever we have in our houses and apartments? Why should we be satisfied with halfway measures?
The answer is that subway searches will do nothing to increase our security or safety. Security expert Robert Schneier, in a widely circulated comment on his web site on July 22, pointed out the real terrorists' response to the subway searches: "Okay guys; here are your explosives. If one of you gets singled out for a search, just turn around and leave. And then go back in via another entrance, or take a taxi to the next subway stop" Only the innocent will be hindered.
Schneier's conclusion: "It's another 'movie plot threat.' It's another 'public relations security system.' It's a waste of money, it substantially reduces our liberties, and it won't make us any safer." And for those who ask what we should do if we don't do that, Schneier has an answer: "Counterterrorism is most effective when it doesn't make arbitrary assumptions about the terrorists' plans. Stop searching bags on the subways, and spend the money on 1) intelligence and investigation -- stopping the terrorists regardless of what their plans are, and 2) emergency response -- lessening the impact of a terrorist attack, regardless of what the plans are. Countermeasures that defend against particular targets, or assume particular tactics, or cause the terrorists to make insignificant modifications in their plans, or that surveil the entire population looking for the few terrorists, are largely not worth it."
http://www.dcwatch.com/themail/2005/05-07-24.htm
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/searching_bags.html
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